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ATTACK ON DECREES OF DIVORCE BY
SECOND SPOUSES'
ALBERT C. JACOBS*
This paper deals with attack on decrees of divorce by second spouses,
a problem of considerable importance. Some 200,000 divorces are
issued in the United States each year. 2 Many of the 400,000 persons
involved, about one-third, 3 relying upon the validity of the divorce, pur-
port to marry again. A marriage contracted during the lifetime of a
spouse from whom there has been no effective marital dissolution is
void, a mere nullity. 4 In general it has no civil effects, notwithstanding
the good faith of the contracting parties.5 A second spouse, in theory,
therefore, would be entitled to a decree of nullity.0 He could not be
called upon to perform any of the marital obligations. Our problem
then is to consider the extent to which a second spouse can show that
the divorce purporting to dissolve the prior marital status of the person
whom he has subsequently married was for some reason defective. Is
he in a position thus to attack the decree and in what ways?
In our typical situation B procures a divorce from her husband, A,
and marries C. The decree has not been questioned -by B. Nor could it
be under normal circumstances.7 Neither has A attacked the divorce,
though in some instances he is in a position to do so effectively.8 At a
* Associate Professor of Law, Columbia University.
'While this subject has been briefly dealt with, Jacobs, Attack on Decrees of
Divorce (1936) 34 MIcH. L. Rav. 959, it seemed to merit further consideration.
2 Since 1870 the annual divorce rate in the United States in proportion to mar-
ried couples has increased some four and one half fold. Except for depression
years the rate of rise has galloped along at a continuous pace. 1929 witnessed the
peak of the trade-201,468 decrees-1.66 per thousand -population, or 16.3 for every
hundred marriages during the year. The ensuing financial collapse reduced this
number to 160,338 in 1932-1.28 per thousand population, but still 16.3 per hundred
marriages. Unfortunately 1932 is the last year for which the official figures of the
Bureau of Census are available. United States Department of Commerce, Bureau
of Census, Eleventh Annual Report on Marriage and Divorce (1934). Again the
business is picking up. Unofficial estimates place the 1935 divorces at 216,000.
1 RECENT SOCIAL TRENDS IN THE UNITED STATES (1933), 696; CAHEN,
SxIATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF AMERICAN DIvoRCE (1932), 98 et seq.; WLLcOX, ENc.
BRIT. (11th ed. 1910) on Divorce; Llewellyn, Behind the Law of Divorce (1933)
33 COL. L. Rav. 249 at 274. Compare, however, RUBINOW, SOME STATISTICAL As-
PECTS OF MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE (1936), 26 et seq., where remarriage among
divorced persons is placed much higher.4D. C. CODE (1929) ti. 14, §1; N. Y. DoMEsTIC RELATIONS LAW, §6; N. C.
CODE ANN. (Michie, 1935) §2494.
'See, however, LA. Civ. CODE ANN. (Dart, 1932) arts. 117, 118, in regard to
the situation where one or both spouses contract such marriage in good faith.
6 N. Y. CIV. PRACTICE ACT (Cahill, 1931) §1134.
'See Jacobs, Attack on Decrees of Divorce (1936) 34 MICH. L. REv. 749 at
760-778.1 See Jacobs, supra note 7, at 778-808.
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subsequent date C seeks to impeach the decree either in the state of the
divorce or elsewhere. For clarity F-1 is here used to designate the state
in which the divorce was granted; F-2 a state other than that in which
the decree in question was rendered. How successful will such an at-
tack be? If for any reason the decree could be impeached by the divorce
respondent, is a second spouse in a similar situation?
A. ATTACK IN F-1
1. On Non-Jurisdictional Grounds
Where a court has jurisdiction of the subject matter of divorce9 and
of the parties,1 0 and has the statutory authorization to grant a divorce,"
the resulting decree is jurisdictionally perfect. The divorce, however,
may have been procured due to the fraud, duress or perjury12 of one
of the spouses, or because of their collusion.' 3 The decree may have
been otherwise defective. But these defects are not available collaterally
to the divorce plaintiff14 or defendant.15 The only possible remedy is
a direct proceeding by the one equitably entitled. Courts, however, have
been very reluctant to set aside such decrees even on direct attack. Gen-
erally the libellant has failed 1 6 except where coercion of the defendant
had been instrumental in the procurement of the decree. 17 The re-
spondent has naturally met with greater success,' 8 but the equitable
rules dealing with the vacation of judgments apply. If the divorce
party, equitably entitled, fails to attack the decree, the divorce should
be conclusive.
'At least one party must be domiciled within the jurisdiction of the court.
"'The court acquires jurisdiction over a iplaintiff who has invoked its aid.
Jurisdiction is acquired over the defendant (1) by the service of process upon him
personally within the court's territorial jurisdiction, or (2) by his voluntary ap-
pearance in the suit, or (3) when he is a domiciled citizen of the state by con-
structive service.
U A court has no common law divorce jurisdiction.
'Perjury as to the ground for divorce is exceedingly common. See Collusive
and Consensual Divorce and ti New York Anomaly (1936) 36 COL. L. REV. 1121.
' For an excellent discussion indicating the general prevalence of collusive
divorce, see note cited, supra note 12.
" In re Limber's Estate, 284 Pa. 346, 131 Atl. 244 (1925) ; Miltemore v. Milte-
more, 40 Pa. 151 (1861) ; Julier v. Julier, 62 Ohio St. 90, 56 N. E. 661 (1900).
'Hamilton v. McNeill, 150 Iowa 470, 129 N. W. 480, Ann. Cas. 1912 D 604
(1911); Davis v. Davis, 61 Me. 395 (1873); Bourne v. Simpson, 48 Ky. 454
(1849); De Graw v. De Graw, 7 Mo. App. 121 (1879); cf. Daniels v. Benedict,
50 Fed. 347 (C. C Colo. 1892).
1' See Jacobs, supra note 7, at 760-765. Barnette v. Miller, 131 Ark. 110, 198
S. W. 873 (1917) ; Hendricks v. Hendricks, 216 Cal. 321; 14 P. (2d) 83 (1932) ;
Henderson v. Henderson, 32 N. D. 520, 156 N. W. 245 (1916); Paffen v. Paffen,
94 N. J. Eq. 356, 120 At. 197 (1922).
2Dennis v. Harris, 179 Iowa 121, 153 N. W. 343 (1917) ; Lake v. Lake, 124
App. Div. 89, 108 N. Y. Supp. 964 (1908); Hblt v. Holt, 23 Okla. 639, 102 Pac.
137 (1909) ; Cobb v. Cobb, 43 S. D. 388, 179 N. W. 498 (1920).
" See Jacobs, supra note 7, at 779-787.
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Thus, the likelihood of an effective direct attack by one of the parties
is small. The libellant's chances are almost nil. The respondent gen-
erally fails to have a collusive decree vacated.1 9 Courts are reluctant
to vacate divorce decrees even where "extrinsic" fraud 20 exists, relying
frequently upon the doctrine of laches or estoppel. 21 In any event most
divorces are friendly proceedings; few are "contested" ;22 the spouses,
therefore, are not interested in instituting vacation proceedings. This
being the situation, should a second spouse be in a position thus to
question the divorce?
In general a third person, not a party to the original action, who
had no standing to appeal from the rendition of the decree, in some
cases is allowed to attack the judgment collaterally for non-jurisdictional
fraud, duress and collusion. Freeman says, however, that
"It is.only those strangers who, if the judgment were given full credit
and effect, would be prejudiced in regard to some pre-existing right, that
are permitted to impeach the judgment."23
The cases clearly indicate that a second spouse does not occupy such
a position. His pre-existing rights have in no way been impaired.
In Ruger v. Heckel,2 4 a second husband sought an annulment of his
marriage to the defendant on the ground that her prior marriage was
still in force. He alleged that the divorce which she had obtained from
her former husband in New York had been procured by collusion, fraud
and false testimony in regard to adultery.2 6 The jurisdiction of the
divorce court was clear. The decree, perfectly regular and valid on its
"Hubbard v. Hubbard, 19 Colo. 13, 34 Pac. 170 (1893) ; Todd v. Rhodes, 108
Kan. 64, 193 Pac. 894 (1920); Karren v. Karren, 25 Utah 87, 69 Pac. 465, 60
L. R. A. 294 (1902).
'9See Jacobs, supra note 7, at 782-784.
'9See Jacobs, supra note 7, at 780-782.
13.3 per cent were "contested" in 1932; 13.9 per cent in 1931; 12.6 per cent in
1930; 11.8 per cent in 1929; and 11.7 per cent in 1928. These figures have been
compiled by the Bureau of Census, and include all cases in which an answer is
filed. But in not more than 5 per cent of the cases is there a real bona fide con-
test. In half of these it is not over the dissolution of the marriage, but in regard
to alimony, property, counsel fees or the custody of children. See MARSHALL AND
MAY, THE DIocE COURT-MARYLAND (1932) 27.
'1 FREEMAN, JUDGMENTS (5th ed. 1925) §319, p. 636.
'85 N. Y. 483 (1881), aff'g. 21 Hun (N. Y. Sup. Ct.) 489 (1880).
-9The parties had been married in 1878 and lived together for nine and a half
months. The wife had obtained a divorce in the Court of Common Pleas for New
York City and County early in 1874. The plaintiff here claimed that the defendant
had represented to him that she was divorced from her former husband and had a
right to remarry.
In general perjured testimony as to the ground for divorce is not sufficient to
entitle the respondent to a vacation of the decree. Zeitlin v. Zeitlin, 202 Mass.
205, 88 N. E. 762 (1909). It is not considered "extrinsic" fraud. "The doctrine
is equally well settled that a court will not set aside a judgment because it was
founded on * * * perjured evidence." United States v. Throckmorton, 98 U. S.
61, 66, 25 L. ed. 93, 95 (1878), per Miller, J.
ATTACK ON DECREES OF DIVORCE 139
face, had not been questioned by either party to the divorce. The second
spouse was not allowed to impeach it. He had not been defrauded.
Mr. Justice Danforth clearly stated the law
26
"In bringing this action the plaintiff meddled with a matter which did
not concern him. . . .He has had the full benefit of his bargain. No
one has questioned his title, and the record which he produces shows a
judgment binding on both parties. . . In refusing to listen to him the
court does not aid in giving effect to a judgment obtained by fraud. It
regards him as a suitor without a cause of action and rejects his petition
because he is not aggrieved."1
2 7
In Robson v. Robson,2 8 a wife sued her second husband for divorce.
The latter asserted the nullity of the marriage because at the time
thereof the complainant had a living husband. But he was not permitted
to set up the invalidity of a divorce obtained by the plaintiff from her
former spouse, on the ground of certain procedural defects.
2 9
A divorce defective because of non-jurisdictional factors is voidable
and not void. It can be collaterally attacked by a second spouse only if
he can show that it injuriously affects his pre-existing rights. Mere
marriage with one of the parties to the divorce does not clothe him with
sufficient interest. Rights which he had at the time of the marriage
have not been impaired. Knowledge of the circumstances of the divorce
would seem to be immaterial. Further, the divorce has not been other-
wise questioned, and, at the time of the attack no one would seem to be
"85 N. Y. 483 at 484 (1881).
=Accord: Ex parte Edwards, 183 Ala. 659, 62 So. 775 (1913). A wife sought
alimony from her second husband who endeavored unsuccessfully to impeach her
prior divorce on the ground of collusion. Per Sayre, 3., pp. 661-662, 62 So. 776:
"The decree * * * may have been collusively obtained. * * * But the court there
had jurisdiction of the subject matter and of the parties, and for aught appearing,
the ground of divorce there set up existed, and was proved by trustworthy
evidence."
161 Mich. 293, 126 N. W. 216 (1910).
'The decree had been granted in less than four months from the filing of the
ccmplaint. The second husband had known of this defect from the beginning.
The doctrine of "laches" was applied.
Corbett v. Corbett, 113 Cal. App. 595, 298 Pac. 819 (1931), is not inconsistent.
There a marriage took place before the divorce decree became final. An annul-
ment was granted to the second husband, even though the final divorce had been
entered nunc pro tunc, as of a date preceding the marriage. The husband was al-
lowed to show that the court had no authority to make such an entry. The nunc
pro tunc decree being void, collateral attack by a third party was clearly per-
missible.
In Lloyd v. Lloyd, 40 Pa. Co. 595 (1913), a second husband unsuccessfully
sought a decree of nullity of his marriage with the defendant on the ground that a
divorce obtained by her first husband was void because the libel had asked for a
decree on the ground of incompatibility of temper, because no alimony had been
provided for or mentioned, and because the divorce costs had not been paid.
In Morrison v. Morrison, 64 Mich. 53, 30 N. W. 903 (1887), a second
husband unsuccessfully interposed as a defense to a divorce suit that the plaintiff
had never been divorced from her former husband because of faulty service by
publication.
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able to do so. The party to the divorce who has remarried, libellant 3°
or respondent,3 ' could not. In any event the divorce plaintiff is
"estopped." While the non-marrying respondent at one time may have
been in a position to attack the decree, his rights have now undoubtedly
been lost by "laches." 32  The second spouse would seem to be and
actually is in no better position. The courts have proceeded along
correct lines.
2. On Jurisdictional Grounds
The jurisdictional scheme of divorce is based upon domicil. Divorce
is a function of the domicil. In theory no divorce can issue in the
absence of domicil of one of the spouses. As some evidence of a change
of domicil the statutes of the several states require a period of residence
therein before the institution of an action for divorce. The duration of
this residence varies materially.
33
Before a court can proceed it must have jurisdiction over the subject
matter of divorce, that is, over the matrimonial status. This means that
there must be domicil of at least one spouse. The libellant by invoking
the judicial powers of the tribunal subjects himself to the jurisdiction
of the court. Jurisdiction is acquired over the respondent (1) by the
service of process upon him personally within the territorial jurisdiction,
or (2) -by his voluntary appearance in the suit, or (3) when he is a
domiciled citizen of the state by constructive service.
In the divorce litigation F-1 has found either expressly or by im-
plication the presence of the essential jurisdictional factors.3 4  This
finding has not been effectively attacked. The libellant is not permitted
to question the jurisdiction of the court either directly3 or collaterally,3 0
no matter how much the divorce tribunal may have lacked jurisdiction.
Remarriage by the respondent generally precludes him from attacking
Barnette v. Miller, supra note 16.
"Robson v. Kramer, 215 Iowa 973, 245 N. W. 341 (1932) ; Cummings v. Hud-
dleston, 99 Okla. 195, 226 Pac. 104 (1924); Nagle v. Nagle, 43 Pa. Super. 442
(1910).
"See Jacobs, supra note 7, at 780-781.
'From five years in Massachusetts (three years where both spouses were in-
habitants of the state at the time of the marriage), Mass. Gen. LAws 1932, c. 208,
§5; to six weeks in Nevada, Sess.LAws 1931, c. 97, §22, p. 161. In Arkansas
(Acts 1931, No. 71, p. 201), Florida (GEN. LAws 1935, p. 444), and Idaho (CoDE
ANN. 1932, §31-701), the period is ninety days. In Wyoming (Sess. LAWS 1935,
§35-109, p. 25), the period is sixty days. The majority of states require a min-
imum residence of one year. ILL. REv. STAT. (Cahill, 1931), c. 40, §3.
'Broduer v. Broduer, 53 R. I. 450 at 454, 167 Ati. 104, 106 (1933), per Mur-
dock, J., "It is true that he (the trial judge) did not make a specific finding as to
residence; but that he so found is implicit in his decision granting the prayer of
the petition."
m Guggenheim v. Guggenheim, 189 Ill. App. 146 (1914) ; McGraw v. McGraw,
46 R. I. 426, 138 Atl. 188 (1927).
3Ellis v. White, 61 Iowa 644, 17 N. E. 28 (1883).
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even a "void" divorce.37 Appearance by him seems to produce like
consequences. 38 The difficulty of proving the absence of domicil and
the reluctance of courts to disturb decrees of divorce often cause a
direct attack -by a respondent to fail.3 9 Seldom has he successfully at-
tacked the F-1 decree collaterally. 40 To entitle him to do so the juris-
dictional defects must appear on the face of the record.
Considering the obstacles to an attack by one of the divorce parties,
it is not at all surprising to find that the second spouse has failed to
have the divorce decree set aside on the ground that the court lacked
jurisdiction.
4 1
"W need not enter into the question of whether or not the judgment
(of divorce) is void, irregular, or erroneous, for the reason that an at-
' RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAws (1934) §112; Arthur v. Israel, 15 Colo.
147, 25 Pac. 81 (1890) ; Marvin v. Foster, 61 Minn. 154, 63 N. W. 484 (1895);
contra: In re Christiansen, 17 Utah 412, 53 Pac. 1003 (1898).
'Confer v. District Court, 49 Nev. 18, 234 Pac. 688 (1925), rehearing denied,
49 Nev. 26, 236 Pac. 1097 (1925).
In Clark v. Clark, 64 Mont. 386, 210 Pac. 93 (1922), the court refused to vacate
the divorce because it felt that the fraud in regard to residence was not "ex-
trinsic" to the -matter tried by the court. In Maples v. Maples, 187 Ark. 127, 58
S. W. (2d) 930 (1933), the court invoked the doctrine of "laches."
For cases where the court has vacated the divorce on direct attack by the
respondent, see Dye v. Dolbeck, 114 Fla. 866, 154 So. 847 (1934); Lawrence v.
Nelson, 113 Iowa 277, 85 N. W. 84 (1901) ; Edson v. Edson, 108 Mass. 590 (1867).
' Edgerton v. Edgerton, 12 Mont. 122, 29 Pac. 966 (1892).
"James v. James, 131 Okla. 276, 268 Pac. 726 (1928). B obtained a divorce
from her husband A in November, 1914, and married C in July, 1918. A also
married again and died in January, 1924. B died in May, 1926. In October of
the same year C petitioned for the vacation of the divorce on the ground that the
court had lacked jurisdiction. The vacation %vas denied. Per Curiam, p. 277, 268
Pac. 727: "The plaintiff in error by his marriage (to B) acknowledged the validity
of the decree of divorce and continued without complaint to acknowledge this
validity until after her death. * * * The parties to the judgment did not complain
and died accepting the benefits of such judgment and the aid they had received
from the court. The plaintiff in error is a suitor without a cause of action, and
his motion is rejected because he is not aggrieved."
In Fairclough v. St. Amand, 217 Ala. 19, 114 So. 472 (1927), while the vaca-
tion proceedings were begun by the first husband (the respondent) on the ground
that the decree had been procured through perjured testimony as to the libel-
ant's residence in Alabama, the court here found that -they were brought at the
instance and instigation of the libellant's second husband. He had instigated and
financed the divorce; had married the libellant; had left her and had remarried
elsewhere where bigamy proceedings were pending. The court, in refusing to set
aside the decree, applied the doctrine of estoppel and "laches." Per Thomas, J.,
p. 21, 114 So. 473: "And such is the estoppel as to invoking the question of the
jurisdiction of the court where the action challenged was invoked or procured by
fraud of a party in interest."
In Van Slyke v. Van Slyke, 186 Mich. 324, 152 N. W. 921 (1915), it was held
that a man who had aided in the instigation of the defendant's divorce suit against
her former husband, intending to marry haer, could not, after the marriage, main-
tain a suit to have the decree set aside on the ground of fraud in regard to
residence, especially where if such fraud existed, he had participated therein. Per
Ostrander, J., p. 328, 152 N. W. 923: "The decree cannot be avoided by the party
guilty of the fraud, nor at the instance of third parties, nor can a party who
obtains the divorce and accepts its benefits afterwards question the jurisdiction
of the court granting it."
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tack upon'the judgment or decree of divorce cannot be maintained by the
plaintiff in error (second husband). "42
The cases consistently adhere to the general rule that a stranger to a
suit has no standing to have an invalid judgment set aside. Equitable
considerations frequently have aided the courts in the denial of such
relief.42"
Most commonly the second spouse has endeavored to obtain an
annulment of his marriage on the ground that the divorce had failed
effectively to dissolve the defendant's prior marriage. He is seeking to
impeach F-l's own decree which has hitherto gone unquestioned. Such
an attack has generally failed.43 Courts have done all in their power to
uphold the divorce against such attack.44 Such has been the case where
it was claimed that the residence of the libellant was insufficient, 45 or
that the service of process on the respondent was ineffective. 46 F-1 is
42 Per Curiam, James v. James, supra note 41, p. 277, 268 Pac. 727.
" James v. James, supra note 41 ; Fairclough v. St. Amand, supra note 41.
"Ewald v. Ewald, 167 Md. 594, 175 Atl. 464 (1934); Sodini v. Sodini, 94
Minn. 301, 102 N. W. 861 (1905); Werz v. Werz, 11 Mo. App. 26 (1881); Rout-
ledge v. Githens, 118 Ore. 70, 245 Pac. 1072, 45 A. L. R 925 (1926).
"In Ewald v. Ewald, supra note 43, a second husband in 1932 sued for an
annulment of a marriage contracted with the defendant in 1926. The defendant
had divorced her first husband, who had subsequently remarried, in 1922. The
annulment was refused. Per Urner, J., p. 597, 175 Atl. 465, 466: "The inquiry
is not whether a decision upon the evidence as to the question of residence should
be affirmed or reversed if it could be considered as an original issue. The question
w'th which we are concerned in this case is whether the decree of the Circuit
Court, dissolving a Maryland marriage for a cause arising in Maryland, should be
nullified because additional evidence, produced twelve years later, has convinced
another chancellor that the decree was erroneous in its determination of the juris-
dictional fact of residence. The record fails to present any reason which seems
to us adequate for such a review and rescission of the decree thus challenged. It
was passed by a court having the power and duty to decide as to the existence of
its jurisdiction over the case, and its unappealed decision of that question should
not be subject to avoidance under such conditions as those which this case
presents."
' Ewald v. Ewald, supra note 43; Routledge v. Githens, supra note 43. In
Werz v. Werz, supra note 43, the second husband unsuccessfully sought an an-
nulment of his marriage on the ground that the defendant's divorce from her
former spouse was void because she had failed to allege in her petition her res-
idence in the county -where she brought suit.
ISodini v. Sodini, supra note 43. A second husband sought an annulment of
his marriage to the defendant on the ground that her divorce from her former
spouse was void on its face because, as he alleged, the record affirmatively showed
that the summons and complaint were never in fact served upon the divorce de-
fendant. Service had been in Pennsylvania upon a person whose true name was
"Bradley" but who sometimes went by the name of "Nelson" (by which he was
known to his wife). The annulment was denied. Per Jaggard, J., pp. 302-304,
102 N. W. 861, 862: "A judgment of a court of superior or general jurisdiction
cannot be collaterally attacked unless the record affirmatively shows want of
jurisdiction. * * * A default judgment in divorce proceedings is no more subject
to such collateral attack than any other judgment. * * * Every intendment is
in favor of a construction which will sustain the judgment. There was nothing
in the summons and complaint, as served, to deceive the defendant. The real
person was in fact served."
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much more reluctant to grant an annulment of a marriage based on a
local divorce than where an F-2 decree is involved. F-1 is even un-
willing to disturb her own divorce decree on a direct attack by the
respondent. And further, while it has been assumed in theory that a
divorce of F-1 where neither spouse is domiciled therein is void even
in F-1, 4 7 it has never been decided that such a decree has no effect
in F-1.
Of course, if the divorce for some reason is clearly void on its
face, ,the second spouse, the same as anyone else, would seem toQ be in
a position to question marital rights predicated thereon.48 The decree
being absolutely void, the subsequent marriage is a nullity, open to
collateral impeachment. But where the infirmity does not appear on the
divorce record but must be proved extrinsically, it is submitted that
the court should leave the second spouse where he has placed himself.
This is particularly so where he knew the circumstances of the divorce,
and even more so where he has instigated or financed the proceedings. 49
B. ATTAcK IN F-2
1. On Non-Jurisdictional Grounds
In but few cases has a second spouse endeavored to attack in F-2
on the ground of some non-jurisdictional defect a marriage predicated
on a divorce decree of F-1. In theory third persons are permitted to
attack a decree collaterally for certain kinds of fraud, but only where
the judgment is injurious to their pre-existing interests. 50 It is, how-
ever, difficult to conceive how a second spouse of one of the divorced
parties could be prejudiced by non-jurisdictional fraud. Such a divorce
is at the most voidable, generally on direct attack in F-1 by the one
equitably entitled.
Thus in Rupp v. Rupp,51 an annulment was refused a second wife
who claimed that the South Dakota divorce procured by a former spouse
against the defendant had been collusively obtained. No question of
jurisdiction could be raised; South Dakota was the domicil of the libel-
See RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS (1934) §113, comment g.
'In Hinkle v. Lovelace, 204 Mo. 208, 102 S. W. 1015 (1907), a second spouse,
defendant in an ejectment suit brought by his wife, effectively attacked a decree
divorcing the plaintiff from her former husband, on the ground that she had not
made the statutory affidavit annexed to her petition for divorce, but such affidavit
had been made in her behelf by her next friend (as disclosed by the divorce peti-
tion), and therefore the court 'was without jurisdiction. The infirmity appeared
on the face of the record and not extrinsically. The decree was absolutely void,
the court having acquired no jurisdiction because of the defective affidavit.
' Fairclough v. St. Amand, supra note 41; Van Slyke v. Van Slyke, supra
note 41.
3 FREEMAN, JUDGMENTs (5th ed. 1925) §1439, p. 2966.
S156 App. Div. 389, 141 N. Y. Supp. 484 (1913).
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lant wife; the respondent had appeared. The plaintiff was in no wise
injured by the alleged collusion.
"Even if it was collusive, the judgment cannot be attacked collaterally
by this plaintiff. She is not aggrieved. . . . If there is any ground
upon which the Dakota judgment can be revoked or annulled for fraud
or imposition, it is for that court to hear and determine them."'5 2
It would be dangerous indeed to allow a second spouse to avoid every
marriage predicated on a divorce tainted with collusion or with perjury
in regard to the statutory ground. Collusive divorce is quite the normal
practice of the day.53 And in general neither party to a collusive di-
vorce can attack the decree either directly or collaterally.5 4 In a recent
case, Atkinson v. Atkinson,55 the court expressly referred to the fact
that neither party to the collusive divorce had attacked it."
Again in Bater v. Bater,5 7 an annulment of a marriage was denied a
second husband who claimed that the divorce granted to the defendant
in New York 'by a court which had jurisdiction of the subject matter
and of the parties was tainted with fraud in that she had suppressed the
fact that in a prior divorce suit in England her petition had been denied
because of her adultery. 5
8
It thus seems clear that a second spouse has no standing to impeach
a divorce decree of F-1 for non-jurisdictional defects.
'Per Rich, J., pp. 390-391, 141 N. Y. Supp. 485; Kinnier v. Kinnier, 53 Barb.
(N. Y.) 454, 455, 456 (1868), per Cardozo, J., "If the courts of this state can en-
tertain a suit to annul the decree of a court of another state, on the ground of fraud,
yet this plaintiff is not in a position to ask such relief. Nor can one claim to have
a judgment * * * avoided for fraud, unless it injuriously affects him; and such is
not the case with this plaintiff."
See Comment (1936) 36 COL. L. REv. 1121.
See Jacobs, supra note 7, at 763-764; 785-788.
'65 App. D. C. 241, 82 F. (2d) 847 (1936). A second husband failed to ob-
tain an annulment of his marriage to the defendant. The defendant's first hus-
band, a bona fide resident of Maryland, had obtained a divorce for desertion;
service had been by publication. The plaintiff claimed that the divorce was col-
lusive and due to false testimony in regard to desertion.
' Per Robb, 3., p. 243, 82 F. (2d) 849: "In our view the Maryland decree may
be given operation in the District of Columbia without violating the principles
of morality or the public policy of the District. The parties were of mature age
and had lived apart for eleven years when the jurisdiction of the Maryland court
was invoked. It is not likely that there would have been reconciliation. It is
equally apparent that each desired a severance of the marriage tie, as the defendant
remarried. Neither party to the decree is attacking it. Under the facts it is more
in the interest of public policy to validate the remarriage than to set it aside."
' (1906) Prob. 209.
' The court pointed out that where F-2 refuses to recognize a decree procured
by fraud or collusion in F-1, "When those cases are examined * * * the collusion or
fraud which was referred to was in every case * * * collusion or fraud relating
to that which went to the root of the matter, namely, the jurisdiction of the
Court." P. 218.
See also Deyette v. Deyette, 92 Vt. 305, 104 At. 232, 233, 234 (1918). Cf., how-
ever, Conway v. Beazley, 3 Hagg. Eccl. Rep. 639 (1831).
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2. On Jurisdictional Grounds
Before we can proceed with this situation we must review the law
concerning the recognition in F-2 of the divorce decrees of F-1. Where
both spouses are bona fide domiciliaries of F-i, the courts thereof are
the only appropriate divorce tribunal. Provided the respondent is given
a reasonable notice of the pendency of the libel, a decree of F-1 will be
entitled to full faith and credit everywhere. 59 Personal jurisdiction over
the defendant is not necessary. Where only one spouse is domiciled in
F-i, but F-1 is the last matrimonial domicil of the parties, the last place
where they have lived together as husband and wife, and reasonable
notice has been given to the respondent, under the decisions of the Su-
preme Court,6 ° the F-1 decree is entitled to full faith and credit. If
F-1 is not the last matrimonial domicil of the spouses, but the domicil
of the libellant only, then if the respondent is personally served in F-1
or if he voluntarily appeared and submitted to the jurisdiction of the
court, the decree is entitled to full faith and credit. 61 If, however, the
service be constructive only and no appearance is entered, the full faith
and credit clause does not protect the divorce. But on the ground of
comity the majority of states will recognize an ex parte divorce obtained
at the domicil of the libellant. 62 The local policy of some few states,
however, sanctioned by Haddock v. Haddock, is strongly against such
recognition where the respondent is a citizen thereof. 63 In the absence
of the domicil of either spouse in theory F-i has no jurisdiction to grant
a divorce.
Domicil is a jurisdictional fact and may 'be raised collaterally by a
RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS (1934) §110, comment b; see Haddock v.
Haddock, 201 U. S. 562, 571, 26 Sup. Ct. 525, 527, 50 L. ed. 867, 870, 5 Ann. Cas.
26 (1906).
"Atherton v. Atherton, 181 U. S. 155, 21 Sup. Ct 544, 45 L. ed. 794 (1901);
Haddock v. Haddock, supra note 59; Thompson v. Thompson, 226 U. S. 551, 33
Sup. Ct. 129, 57 L. ed. 347 (1913).
" See Haddock v. H1addock, supra note 59; RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS
(1934) §113a (iii), and-comment g.
'Gildersleeve v. Gildersleeve, 88 Conn. 689, 92 Atl. 684 (1914) ; Miller v.
Miller, 200 Iowa 1193, 206 N. W. 262 (1925).
People v. Baker, 76 N. Y. 78 (1879). In Greenberg v. Greenberg, 218 App.
Div. 104 at 112, 218 N. Y. Supp. 87, 94 (1926), it was said -per Dowling, J.,
"'This State has settled as its adjudged policy to refuse to recognize as binding a
decree of divorce obtained in a court of a sister State * * * when the divorce
defendant resided in this State and was not personally served with process and did
not appear in the action."
For New York policy where the divorce defendant is not a resident of New
York, see Dean v. Dean, 241 N. Y. 240, 149 N. E. 844 (1925) ; Ball v. Cross, 231
N. Y. 329, 132 N. E. 106 (1921).
For states having a policy somewhat similar to that of New York, see: Irby
v. Wilson, 21 N. C. 568 (1837) ; Harris v. Harris, 115 N. C. 587, 20 S. E. 187
(1894) ; Duncan v. Duncan, 265 Pa. 464, 109 Atl. 220 (1920) ; State v. Duncan,
110 S. C. 253, 96 S. E. 294 (1918) ; McCreery v. Davis, 44 S. C. 195, 22 S. E. 178
(1895).
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respondent who was not before the court.6 4 If he can show the lack
of domicil of the libellant in F-1 and no remarriage by himself, the
decree would be ineffective as to him. And further the cx parte decree
rendered at the domicil of the libellant only may be contrary to the
established policy of F-2, which policy the respondent, if a resident of
F-2 at the time of the divorce, may effectively invoke. Thus as against
a respondent not subject to the personal jurisdiction of the court, the
decree would be "void" and open to attack.
To what extent then is the F-1 decree impeachable by the second
spouse? Does the answer to this question depend merely upon the view
of F-2 in regard to the decree of F-i, upon the form of the attack, or
upon the character of the conduct of such spouse in regard to the
divorce ?
The typical method of attack has been a suit for a decree of nullity
of the marriage brought 'by the second spouse on the ground that the
divorce failed effectively to dissolve the defendant's prior marriage. In
a number of cases the decision has turned merely on the attitude of F-2
towards the F-1 decree. This has been decided on the basis of the policy
of F-2 already discussed. For example, if F-2 refuses to recognize an
ex parte decree obtained at the domicil of the libellant against a resident
of F-2, a marriage based thereon has frequently been declared a
nullity.6 5 Thus in Pridgen v. Pridgen,6 6 the defendant's first husband
had procured an ex parte divorce in Georgia in 1917, the service of sum-
mons having been by publication. The defendant had always resided in
REsTATEmENT, CoNFLIcT oF LAws (1934) §111, comment a.
O'Dea v. O'Dea, 101 N. Y. 23, 4 N. E. 110 (1885) (no personal service over
the respondent) ; Gilson v. Airy, 181 App. Div. 761, 169 N. Y. Supp. 242 (1918)
(no personal service over 'the respondent) ; Knill v. Knill, 119 .Misc. 186, 195
N. Y. Supp. 398 (1922) (the domicil of the libellant in Nevada was not bona
fide); Davis v. Davis, 2 Misc. 549, 22 N. Y. Supp. 191 (1893) (no personal
service over the respondent).
In Hindermann v. Hindermann, 245 App. Div. 246, 280 N. Y. Supp. 449
(1935), an appearance entered nunc pro tunc in the Nevada divorce proceedings
was held ineffective to make the divorce good in New York. A second spouse
was granted an annulment of the marriage. Per Johnston, J., p. 247, 280 N. Y.
Supp. 451: "The Nevada court, however, never acquired jurisdiction of appellant
(defendant) until May 4, 1934, which was nearly thirteen months after her mar-
riage with respondent and more than eight months after the institution of the
instant action. Appellant's marriage with respondent was void under our statute,
and was not made valid by the modified decree of the Nevada court."
In the following cases the annulment of the second marriage has been refused:
Ball v. Cross, supra note 63, where a new trial was ordered to ascertain if the
residence of .the respondent at the time of the divorce would have recognized the
ex parte Reno decree; Rocco v. Rocco, 131 Misc. 867, 228 N. Y. Supp. 405 (1928),
where the annulment was refused because the defendant's domicil at the time of
the ex parte divorce would recognize the decree; Schenker v. Schenker, 181 App.
Div. 621, 169 N. Y. Supp. 35 (1918) ; Beischer v. Beischer, 226 App. Div. 454, 235
N. Y. Supp. 652 (1929) ; Richards v. Richards, 132 Misc. 551, 230 N. Y. Supp.
579 (1928).
-203 N. C. 533, 166 S. E. 591 (1932).
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North Carolina. The Georgia decree was declared a nullity in North
Carolina. Thus the divorce being void, so with the marriage; it creates
no rights nor duties. It is a nullity even without the aid of a court
degree. It is to be expected that the cases on this point would arise in
a jurisdiction having a peculiar local policy in regard to F-1 decrees.
And such has been the case. There is no necessity of proving no legal
domicil on the part of the libellant but only the lack of personal juris-
diction over the respondent.
The divorce has been considered void as to the second spouse even
though it could not, under principles already considered, have been im-
peached by the libellant, or even by the respondent because of his re-
marriage.0 7 The second spouse has thus been allowed to show the
invalidity of the decree because of the lack of legal residence in F-i, or
because of the lack of personal jurisdiction over a respondent residing
in a state with a peculiar local policy such as New York. The F-2
court here had to choose between holding the remarriage a nullity be-
cause of the void character of the divorce, and departing from the
ordinary policy of the state in regard to ex parte decrees. It is sub-
mitted that F-2, when such an attack is made, should earnestly endeavor
to give effect to the F-1 decree; every presumption should be invoked
in its favor.68 Particularly is this so when it is remembered that the
attacking spouse is typically the husband, obviously regretful of his
present marital ties based on a divorce which has not otherwise been
questioned.
In the cases hitherto discussed the second spouse has, according to
the available evidence, in no way participated in or instigated the F-1
divorce. And typically the respondent has not appeared in the F-1 pro-
ceedings. Where the respondent has participated in the divorce suit,
the case against the second spouse's attack is all the stronger. The
divorce then cannot be questioned by the libellant or by the respondent.
And it should not be by a person who has married one of the divorced
parties. 69 In Kinnier v. Kinnier,70 the second husband sought an annul-
" Frey v. Frey, 61 App. D. C. 232, 59 F. (2d) 1046 (1932).
'See cases cited in the last paragraph of note 65 supra.
In Farr v. Farr, 190 Iowa 1005, 181 N. W. 268 (1921), the second husband
was denied an annulment on his complaint that the Illinois court, in granting a
divorce, had lacked jurisdiction over the defendant's first husband. The court,
even assuming the service was ineffective, felt that the plaintiff was not entitled
to an annulment, pointing out that the respondent by laches might have debarred
himself from the right to attack the divorce in a direct action.
In French v. French, 74 Misc. 626, 131 N. Y. Supp. 1053 (1911), an annul-
ment was denied to a second wife who sought to impeach a South Dakota divorce
procured by the defendant's first wife by -the latter's testimony that she had not
been a bona fide resident of South Dakota.
"In Hindermann v. Hindermann, supra note 65, an appearance entered nunc
pro tunc was held ineffective. - 45 N. Y. 535 (1871).
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ment of his marriage to the defendant on the ground that the latter was
still married to her first husband. The complaint alleged that the de-
fendant had been divorced, some sixteen years before, by her former
spouse in Illinois in a suit in which she had appeared and answered;
that the libellant had never been domiciled in Illinois, as a consequence
of which the decree was a nullity. On a demurrer to the complaint the
court decided that the Illinois decree could not be thus impeached.
"The question whether he (divorce plaintiff) was a resident there
(Illinois), so as to enable him to file his bill, was for that court to de-
termine, and although it may have decided erroneously, the decision
cannot affect the validity of the judgment. The status of all persons
within a state is exclusively for that state to determine for itself."
' 71
We must now determine whether the courts of F-2 will, under any
circumstances, consider whether the second spouse comes into court with
"clean hands." Suppose he has known of the circumstances of the F-1
decree; that he has instigated or financed the proceedings there.
In Kaufman v. Kaufman,72 the New York Appellate Division held
that the second husband could not obtain an annulment of his marriage
with the defendant. He had contended that the Nevada divorce pro-
cured by the defendant was invalid under the special New York rule.
The complainant in the annulment suit had financed and induced the
Nevada proceedings. He was held estopped from invoking the state
policy of New York, even though the service of summons in the divorce
case had been by publication only and the respondent had not appeared.73
"If, as claimed by the plaintiff, the marriage between him and the de-
fendant was absolutely void, no decree of the court is required to declare
its invalidity. . . .He, however, seeks a judicial decree annulling it in
order that he may be sure of his status. If, in any circumstances, the
court would be warranted in refusing to grant a decree annulling a void
marriage upon grounds of equitable considerations or estoppel, I am of
opinion that the facts shown by the evidence and found by the trial
court justify withholding a decree in the case at bar."
7 4
"Per Church, J., p. 540. In Kinnier v. Kinnier the parties to the divorce
were probably domiciled in Massachusetts at the time of the collusive Illinois
decree.
177 App. Div. 162, 163 N. Y. Supp. 566 (1917).
'The Nevada court had found the wife to be a bona fide resident of Nevada.
There was some doubt as to the New York residence of the first husband at the
time of the divorce. But it was held that even if he were a resident thereof, the
second husband was in no position to take advantage of the New York policy
which had been adopted to protect New York respondents. Per Laughlin, J., p.
166, 163 N. Y. Supp. 570: "The plaintiff, who induced the defendant to obtain
the foreign divorce and financed her in so doing, should be precluded from ob-
taining a judicial annulment of the marriage predicated on the invalidity of the
divorce."
"' Per Laughlin, J., p. 165, 163 N. Y. Supp. 569. In Hubbard v. Hubbard, 228
N. Y. 81 at 87, 126 N. E. 508, 510 (1920), in refusing an annulment, Collin, J., said
by way of dictum: "A finding of the trial court was that he (the second husband)
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Even if the divorce were void, and so, therefore, the marriage predicated
thereon, the court because of the plaintiff's conduct, refused the aid of
its decree to define his status. No one else had questioned the divorce.
'Unless and until it has been effectively impeached by the divorce re-
spondent, the second spouse would seem to have no standing to seek
an annulment of his marriage. Certainly not where he has instigated
and financed the divorce. The principles of equitable estoppel would
seem to apply. An equitable estoppel has been said to arise
"where one by his words or conduct willfully causes another to believe
the existence of a certain state of things, and induces him to act on that
belief so as to alter his previous position,"
and
"the former is concluded from averring against the latter a different
state of things as existing at the same time." 75
The second spouse has induced the defendant to believe in the efficacy
of the divorce and in reliance on that belief to marry him.76 Even if
the divorce were void, for some reason or other, it is submitted that the
court should refuse a decree of nullity to the second spouse. Until
someone entitled to do so proves the lack of jurisdictional factors, the
decree is valid. These factors the second spouse who has known of or
who has induced the divorce should not be entitled to prove.7"
instigated the procurement of the divorce. The moral or legal principles adopted
by'the state will not be weakened or deteriorated by the refusal to declare unlawful
and void the marriage between the parties." The court apparently indicated its
approval of the decision in Kaufman v. Kaufman, supra note 72. No question of
New York policy was involved.
BIGELow, EsToPPE (6th ed. 1913) 607.
"The court in Kaufman v. Kaufman, supra note 72, felt that the plaintiff was
attempting "to use the court to enable him to perpetrate an outrage against so-
ciety as well as an injustice on the defendant, who in marrying him acted in entire
good faith and in the belief, induced by him, that the marriage 'would be valid."
P. 165, 163 N. Y. Supp. 569.
71 In Hall v. Hall, 139 App. Div. 120, 123 N. Y. Supp. 1056 (1910), reversing
67 Misc. 267, 122 N. Y. Supp. 401 (1910), an annulment was refused a second hus-
band. He had known that the divorce was to be procured by the defendant in
order to enable him to marry her. He had alleged in -his complaint that the
Colorado divorce based on constructive service was void because the court lacked
jurisdiction over the respondent; also that the Colorado libellant had used fraud
in obtaining the decree. Colorado was the matrimonial domicil. Per Laughlin,
J., p. 125, 123 N. Y. Supp. 1061: "Her former husband, if living, may avoid it'
for fraud, but he had not done so. If it (the divorce) be duly annulled, the plaintiff
may then be in a position to annul his marriage to the defendant, but he has no
standing to avoid it for fraud, because he is not injuriously affected by it; but on
the contrary, by virtue of it, he got just what he wanted (marriage with the
defendant here)."
In Sorenson v. Sorenson, 219 App. Div. 344, 220 N. Y. Supp. 242 (1927), in
denying a second husband an annulment of his marriage with the defendant, it
was said, per Kapper, J., pp. 349-351, 220 N. Y. Supp. 246, 248: "In the circum-
stances I do not think the plaintiff can be heard to attack the validity of the Dan-
ish decree. This does not proceed upon the theory of estoppel, but upon the
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In several cases, however, even though the second spouse has known
of or has been instrumental in the procurement of the divorce in F-i,
the courts of F-2 have been willing to grant him a decree of nullity of
his marriage on the ground of the invalidity of the divorce.78 'In
most of the cases a suit for divorce or separation has been brought
against the second spouse and the latter has filed a cross-bill for a decree
of nullity. The divorce being considered a nullity, the marriage is
void, and these courts have allowed the second spouse to prove this no
matter how unconscionable his conduct may have been, 79 and even
though the rights of innocent third persons are involved. The marriage
ground that the attack on the decree must be made by the parties to it and cannot
be mide by the plaintiff, a second husband, claiming such a decree, of which he
had full cognizance, to be invalid. * * * If the defendant in the divorce decree
does not complain of that, then the second husband is in no position to make the
claim where he had full knowledge of the decree, and no fraud was practiced upon
him."
See also Cesareo v. Cesareo, 134 Misc. 88, 234 N. Y. Supp. 44, 45 (1929).
Frey v. Frey, supra note 67; Simmons v. Simmons, 57 App. D. C. 216, 19 F.
(2d) 690, 54 A. L. R. 80 (1927) ; Kiessenbeck v. Kiessenbeck, 145 Ore. 82, 26 P.
(2d) 58 (1933).
In Frey v. Frey, supra note 67, A sued his wife B for divorce in the Dis-
trict of Columbia, naming C as a correspondent. C, a lawyer, later induced A to
dismiss the suit in order that A's wife might obtain a divorce in Virginia for
desertion, as she did in 1925. In 1926 A married again in good faith and has two
children. In 1927 C married B. B now sues C for a limited divorce and for
maintenance. C files a cross-bill for annulment of the marriage. The marriage
was set aside as void. The trial court found that the Virginia divorce was fraud-
ulent and void and that C "devised the plan by which such fraud was practiced";
that the divorce was collusive; that B, as the parties knew, was not domiciled in
Virginia; that perjured testimony was given; that A had a complete defense to
the divorce because B and C were living together at the time thereof. "If it were
open to us to choose the course we should take in such circumstances, we should
decline to have the processes of the court used to judicially annul the subsequent
marriage of appellant (B) and appellee (C), but should consider it our duty to
deny to the one the monetary relief which she (B) seeks, and to the other release
from responsibilities which he has grown to regret, and instead, to apply in their
case that wise and salutary principle that the -law estops a party to allege in a
court of justice his own wrong. But the difficulty confronting us grows out of the
fact that here the marriage between appellant and appellee is a void marriage, and
this is so because the court below has found, and we must find, that the Virginia
court was wholly without jurisdiction to grant a divorce." P. 234, 59 F. (2d)
1084.
In Simmons v. Simmons, smpra note 78, a wife sued for divorce on the ground
of adultery. The defendant answered and asked for an annulment of the mar-
riage because there -had been no legal divorce dissolving the plaintiff's prior mar-
riage. The plaintiff had procured a divorce in Virginia in 1918 and had married
the defendant in the same year, and had been living with him since that time.
The court found that the Virginia divorce had been procured by fraud both in
regard to residence and desertion. Apparently the defendant had furnished the
plaintiff with money to carry on the suit. The marriage being declared void by
statute, the court refused to apply the doctrine of it; pari delicto or clean hands.
The state being an interested party, the court felt that it was without power to
validate the marriage. The marriage was void in law "and the courts have no
alternative when the matter is presented, either directly or collaterally, in any
manner in which it becomes an issue, but to declare it so." Per Van Orsdel, J.,
p. 219, 19 F. (2d) 693.
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being void, the decree of nullity, the courts feel, adds nothing, but
simply acts as an estoppel against setting up the validity of the mar-
riage in any subsequent controversy. The property rights of the parties
are left where they were before. The decree merely shows that there
never was a valid marriage.
"If the complaint were acquiring any rights -by virtue of-his suit, other
than the determination of his status in society, a different rule might
apply, but he is acquiring none."
80
In these cases the interest of the state in the suit is emphasized.8 '
Therefore, there is no alternative but to grant the annulment. It is
submitted that these cases are wrong. A second spouse should not get
the benefit of a decree of nullity. He should be left where he has seen
fit to place himself.
In the cases already discussed the second spouse has sought "affirm-
ative relief" from the court in the form of an annulment of his marriage
with the party to the divorce. In two recent cases in the New York
Court of Appeals, Fischer v. Fischer,8 2 and Lefferts v. Lefferts,8 3 the
libellant wife, 'following an ex parte decree in Nevada, had remarried,
and sued the second husband in New York for separation and main-
tenance. In each case the second husband was allowed to invoke the
special New York rule to show the invalidity of the F-1 decree. In the
Lefferts case the second husband had advised the libellant as to procur-
ing the Reno divorce.8 4 The court refused to raise an estoppel against
wHeflinger v. Heflinger, 136 Va. 289, 302, 118 S. E. 316, 320 (1923), per
Burk, J.
In Kiessenbeck v. Kiessenbeck, supra note 78, a wife sued for support and
maintenance. The defendant's cross-bill for annulment of the marriage was
granted. A divorce obtained by the plaintiff wife in Texas was held void because
she had not satisfied the residence requirements, as appeared by her own testimony.
The defendant had advised her as to the procurement of the divorce. Per Belt, J.,
p. 87, 26 P. (2d) 60: "The interest of the state is paramount and, notwithstanding
the laches involved and the fact that the defendant was not the victim of any
fraud, equity, even at this late day (fifteen years after the divorce), will, on the
ground of public policy, terminate a social relationship polygamous in character."
" In any event there is no estoppel as against the state, People v. Dawell, 25
Mich. 247 (1872) ; People v. Baker, 76 N. Y. 78 (1879) ; Van Fossen v. State,
37 Ohio St. 317 (1881).
254 N. Y. 463, 173 N. E. 680 (1930). The respondent was a resident of New
York. The wife's residence in Nqvada was found to be colorable, merely for the
purpose of the divorce. Five months after the decree she had married the de-
fendant and lived with him less than three months.
263 N. Y. 131, 188 N. E. 279 (1933). The Appellate Division and the Court
of Appeals held that the plaintiff's residence in Nevada was colorable. She mar-
ried the defendant in 1917 and lived with him until 1930. The court felt bound
by Fischer v. Fischer.
' In the Appellate Division, Lefferts v. Lefferts, 238 App. Div. 37 at 38; 262
N. Y. Supp. 671, 673 (1933), Sherman, J., said: "While the conduct of the de-
fendant in entering this plea is to be regarded as thoroughly reprehensible, never-
theless the declared public policy of this State requires that the court may not grant
potency to the decree of the Nevada court."
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the second spouse to attack the decree on the ground that the wife had
not been a bona fide resident of F-1.8 5 In view of these cases it is by
no means clear as to whether Kaufman v. Kaufmn s;80 is still good law.
In Fischer v. Fischer, Mr. Justice O'Brien said:
"The theory upon which the plaintiff has succeeded (in the courts be-
low) rests upon a supposed resemblance in principle to Kaufman v.
Kaufman and upon the judicial declaration that defendant is estopped
from assailing the validity of a foreign judgment. The judgment in the
Kaufman case was never reviewed by this court. In Hubbard v. Hub-
bard8 7 it was cited on the briefs but was not mentioned in the opinion.
Even if approval of its doctrine were to be assumed, its essential facts
are so unlike those at bar as to prevent the application of the rule.
There the New York citizenship and residence of the first husband were
unproved. Also the complaint in that action by the second husband for
an annulment demanded affirmative relief. Here defendant does not
come into court with demand for affirmative relief. He merely alleges
plaintiff's marriage with Dolinsky (first husband), denies plaintiff's
allegation concerning his own marriage with her and puts her to her
proof to show that such allegation is correct."
8 8
The distinction drawn in regard to affirmative relief is hard to
justify. By denying the wife support in her separation action, the court
refuses to recognize the usual incidents of the marriage. The position
would be just the same if there had been a judicial decree of nullity.80
In other jurisdictions there are decisions which seem to be contrary
to the recent New York cases. In Margulies v. Margulies,0o an applica-
tion for alimony pendente lite was resisted by a second husband on the
ground that the parties were not married because the plaintiff had ob-
" See Derby, Obligation of Invalid Divorce on Person Who Induced It and
Married Party Procuring It (1934) 12 N. Y. U. L. Q. REV. 31.
Supra note 72.
rnSupra note 74.
254 N. Y. 466, 173 N. E. 681.
The idea of affirmative relief has cropped up elsewhere in the New York cases.
In Brown v. Brown, 242 App. Div. 33, 272 N. Y. Supp. 877 (1934), afflrined 266
N. Y. 532, 195 N. E. 186 (1935), an action was brought for money spent for main-
tenance from the time of abandonment by the defendant to the commencement of
the action. The defendant husband was not allowed to show that the divorce he
-had obtained from his former wife in South Dakota was void for lack of juris-
diction. The Appellate Division, however, was troubled by the matter of affirm-
ative relief. Two judges dissented, p. 34, 272 N. Y. Supp. 878: "As defendant is
not seeking affirmative relief it is proper for him to assert the invalidity of the
South Dakota divorce proceeding as a defense to this action."
6 Derby, supra note 85, at 37: "It may well be observed that the Court of
Appeals in permitting the defendant to attack the validity of his marriage in both
the Fischer and Lefferts cases, by establishing the invalidity of the plaintiff's prior
divorce, created precisely the same result as if the defendant had secured an an-
nulment He was thereby relieved of all marital obligations, and the nullity of his
marriage was declared. It would seem that a court of equity should care more
about the substance than the form.
0 109 N. J. Eq. 391, 157 Ati. 676 (1931).
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tained a Virginia divorce -by a fraud on the court in as much as she
was not a bona fide resident thereof. The defendant had given her
money to go to Virginia. He knew of the fraud and later married her.
He lived with her for about seven years. The alimony was allowed.
He was estopped from setting up the invalidity of the divorce. 9 1 This,
it is submitted, is the more sensible view. Legal theory, as well as a
sense of social justice, should preclude even this type of attack by a
second spouse. No one has questioned his marital status. The unfair
conduct of the person impeaching the validity of the divorce should
make it inequitable for him to attack it, whether affirmatively or not.
Conclusion
The cases are clear that a second spouse cannot attack in F-1 a mar-
riage predicated on an F-1 divorce because of non-jurisdictional
grounds, such as fraud, duress, collusion or perjury. As a stranger to
the divorce judgment his pre-existing rights have in no wise been im-
paired, and it is difficult to see how they could be. Until the divorce
decree has been annulled in appropriate proceedings, it should be con-
clusive against him. When he purports to attack the decree in F-2 on
such grounds, the case against him is even stronger. A respondent is
not even permitted to make such an attack. 92 When the attack on the
F-1 decree is made in F-1 on jurisdictional grounds, different con-
siderations enter the picture. The divorce court has found the existence
of the essential jurisdictional factors. To be valid in F-1 until set aside
by the respondent, the divorce does not have to be one that would be
effective elsewhere. It is submitted that except where the decree is
clearly void, as appears from the record, no attack thereon should be
permitted to the second spouse. And even then if he knew of the cir-
cumstances or aided in or instigated its procurement, he should be de-
barred from impeaching it. It is easier to make an effective jurisdic-
tional attack on a divorce in F-2. And in a number of cases a second
spouse has been permitted to make such an attack because a respondent
not subject to the jurisdiction of the F-1 court would have been able
to do so. This would seem to be on the theory that a divorce decree is
always good or always bad. This, it is submitted, is incorrect. Just
" Per Church, V. C., at p. 392, 157 Atl. 677: "If there were fraud, which does
not conclusively appear, he participated in it, and this court will not allow him to
take advantage of his own wrong."
In Cromarty v. Cromarty, 38 Ont. L. 481, 33 D. L. R. 151 (1917), per Middle-
ton, J., at p. 484: "At this point of time, the defendant has no right to complain.
He accepted the situation and married the plaintiff upon the faith of the status
thus conferred upon her; and it would be a monstrous thing to hold that this mar-
riage conferred upon him any status to attack the earlier divorce and so annul
his marriage."
' See Jacobs, supra note 7, at 794-795.
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as the law of property recognizes the doctrine of the relativity of estates,
so we suggest a doctrine of the relativity of divorces. Frequently the
decree is good as against some persons, a nullity when attacked by
others. A divorce good as to the libellant may not be when attacked by
the respondent. And so divorces, while perhaps invalid as to the
respondent, should not be without effect for some purposes, partic-
ularly as to a second spouse, when unquestioned by the respondent.
Especially would this seem to be the case where the second spouse
knew of the circumstances of the divorce or aided or instigated or
financed its procurement. And in any event, on an attack by the second
spouse, every presumption should be employed in favor of the decree.
A second spouse typically considers an attack on the marriage
predicated on the invalidity of the divorce as an easy way out of an
unsatisfactory marital relationship. It is often highly advantageous
from a financial standpoint because, in the absence of express statutes,
no property interests are acquired in his estate. Further proof of this
is indicated by the fact that in the great majority of cases the attacking
second spouse is the husband.
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' This is true in thirty-nine of the forty-three cases considered.
